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Footnotes
1. No. 12-872.
2. 134 S. Ct. 2 (2013). For an account of the difficulties, see Lyle
Denniston, Argument Recap: A Bad Way to Open a Term, SCOTUS-
BLOG, Oct. 7, 2013, http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/10/argu-
ment-recap-a-bad-way-to-open-a-term.
3. 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014).
4. During that 12-year period, only four non-Christians provided the
prayers, and all four of those appeared in 2008, when the town
first heard rumblings of litigation.
5. 463 U.S.783 (1983).
6. 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
7. Id. at 1822-23.
8. Id. at 1823; see also id. at 1824 (“Absent a pattern of prayers that
over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible gov-
ernment purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a
prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation.”).
9. Id. at 1838 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693-94 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-41
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Writing solely for himself, Justice
Thomas also reiterated his view that the Establishment Clause is
a “federalism provision” principally aimed at preventing Congress
both from establishing a national religion and from interfering
The Court’s 2013-2014 Term did not begin auspiciously. InMadigan v. Levin1—the first orally argued case of the newsession—the justices were slated to decide whether the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act leaves employees of
state and local governments free to bring age-discrimination
claims under Section 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause.
After a variety of procedural and substantive difficulties
emerged during oral argument, however, the Court declared
that its grant of certiorari had been improvident.2 Happily,
Madigan proved to be a quickly forgotten bump in the road.
Over the following nine months, the Court handed down yet
another set of important and interesting rulings in civil cases,
on matters ranging from abortion clinics’ buffer zones to
Younger abstention. Like the civic leaders of Greece, New
York, we will begin by turning our thoughts to prayer.
FIRST AMENDMENT: ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In Town of Greece v. Galloway,3 a 5-4 Court upheld Greece’s
practice of inviting local clergy and laypeople to open each of
the town’s monthly board meetings with a prayer. During the
12-year period at issue, Greece never denied a non-Christian’s
request to serve as a prayer-giver, but the overwhelming
majority of those who were solicited by the town’s staff or who
volunteered on their own initiative were Christian ministers.4
The town did not screen the prayers in advance, nor did it
provide advice about the kinds of things that the prayers
should or should not include. Many of the prayers were
explicitly Christian in content.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, Justice Kennedy found the Court’s 1983
ruling in Marsh v. Chambers5 all but dispositive. Upholding
the Nebraska legislature’s practice of beginning each day with
a prayer, the Marsh Court had relied heavily upon its histori-
cal survey of the legislative prayer practices that prevailed
from the colonial era through the following two centuries.
Writing in Town of Greece, Justice Kennedy found that “Marsh
stands for the proposition that it is not necessary to define the
precise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history
shows that the specific practice is permitted.”6 Many of the
founding-era prayers offered in Congress and elsewhere were
sectarian in nature, the Court said, and so the fact that tenets
of Christianity appeared prominently in many of the prayers
in Greece’s town meetings was not constitutionally problem-
atic. “Once it invites prayer into the public sphere,” Justice
Kennedy wrote, “government must permit a prayer giver to
address his or her own God or gods as conscience dictates,
unfettered by what an administrator or judge considers to be
nonsectarian.”7 That does not necessarily mean, however, that
the Constitution places no limits on the prayers’ contents:
If the course and practice over time shows that the invo-
cations denigrate nonbelievers or religious minorities,
threaten damnation, or preach conversion, many pre-
sent may consider the prayer to fall short of the desire
to elevate the purpose of the occasion and to unite law-
makers in their common effort. That circumstance
would present a different case than the one presently
before the Court.8
In a portion of his opinion joined only by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, Justice Kennedy found that nonbe-
lievers in attendance at Greece’s board meetings were not psy-
chologically coerced into participating in the prayers. Justices
Thomas and Scalia wrote separately to reiterate their view that,
when it comes to finding Establishment Clause violations, the
only kind of coercion that matters is “actual legal coercion,”
where those who resist face law-backed threats of penalties.9
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with states’ choices about whether to establish religions of their
own. Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1835-37 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment).
10. Id. at 1851 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120E1/2(b). The statute applied only
during such facilities’ business hours and required that the buffer
zones be “clearly marked and posted.” Id. § 120E1/2(c).
12. 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
13. Id. at 2544 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
14. Id. at 2541 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
15. Id. at 2548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
16. Id. at 2550 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
17. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
18. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor. She found that Greece’s actions dif-
fered from those of the Nebraska legislature in Marsh in prob-
lematic ways but that the town could have cured the consti-
tutional defects either by advising the prayer-givers to “speak
in nonsectarian terms, common to diverse religious groups,”
or by ensuring that clergy representing different faiths deliver
the prayers so that “the government does not identify itself
with one religion or align itself with that faith’s citizens.”10
FIRST AMENDMENT: SPEECH
ABORTION CLINICS AND BUFFER ZONES
In 2007, Massachusetts made it a crime to “knowingly
enter or remain on a public way or sidewalk” within 35 feet of
the entrance or driveway to a facility (other than a hospital)
that performs abortions.11 The statute exempted those who
were entering or leaving such a facility, those who were agents
or employees of the facility and acting within the scope of
their employment, certain government officials, and people
who were merely passing through. Several individuals chal-
lenged the law, saying that they wished to engage abortion-
seeking women in non-confrontational “sidewalk counseling”
and to offer them anti-abortion literature—things that they
could not do nearly as easily when categorically barred from
entering the buffer zones defined by state law. In McCullen v.
Coakley,12 all nine justices agreed that the statute violated the
First Amendment, but they were divided on the reasons.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the majority, joined by Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. In their judg-
ment, the Massachusetts statute was content-neutral. The law
was driven not by a desire to squelch anti-abortion speech, the
Court said, but rather by the need to deal with the safety and
access issues that arise when large numbers of people congre-
gate outside abortion clinics. The majority nevertheless held
the law unconstitutional because it burdened substantially
more speech than was necessary to achieve the state’s objec-
tives. The Court said that the state could, for example, rely
more heavily upon an unchallenged state law that makes it a
crime to knowingly impede a person’s entry into a clinic; it
could adopt legislation modeled on the federal Freedom of
Access to Clinic Entrances Act (which bans the use of force,
physical obstruction, and intimidation against a person seek-
ing reproductive services); or it could adopt legislation mod-
eled on a New York City ordinance that makes it a crime to
follow and harass a person within close proximity to an abor-
tion clinic’s entrance.
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, joined by Jus-
tices Kennedy and Thomas. He insisted that the statute was
content-based and that strict scrutiny thus ought to be
applied. “Every objective indication shows,” he wrote, “that
the [statute’s] primary purpose
is to restrict speech that
opposes abortion.”13 By finding
the law content-neutral, he
argued, the majority had “car-
rie[d] forward this Court’s prac-
tice of giving abortion-rights
advocates a pass when it comes
to suppressing the free-speech
rights of their opponents.”14 He
conceded that he likely agreed
with the majority’s finding that
the law was insufficiently tai-
lored but said that he declined
to join that part of the Chief
Justice’s opinion because he
“prefer[ed] not to take part in the assembling of an apparent
but specious unanimity.”15 Justice Alito similarly concurred
in the judgment, finding that the statute “blatantly discrimi-
nates based on viewpoint.”16
CAMPAIGN FINANCE
In McCutcheon v. FEC,17 the Court voted 5-4 to strike down
federal aggregate limits on campaign contributions. The Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as amended by
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, imposes base
limits on how much an individual may contribute per election
cycle to a given federal candidate, party committee, or politi-
cal action committee. That legislation also imposed aggregate
limits on how much an individual could contribute in an elec-
tion cycle to all federal candidates and to certain political
committees. The government’s primary rationale for the
aggregate limits was that they prevented donors from circum-
venting the base limits and from thereby triggering the same
quid pro quo corruption concerns that the base limits were
intended to address. 
Wishing to make sizable contributions to federal candi-
dates across the country and to a variety of Republican
national party committees, Shaun McCutcheon bumped up
against the aggregate limits during the 2011-2012 election
season and believed he would encounter the same difficulty in
the future. He filed suit, alleging that those limits impinged
upon his First Amendment rights of speech and association.
The Republican National Committee (RNC) joined the chal-
lenge, arguing that this was a welcome opportunity for the
justices to reject the constitutional distinction that the Court
drew in Buckley v. Valeo18 between expenditures and contribu-
tions. Under Buckley, the Court strictly scrutinizes restric-
tions on campaign expenditures but reviews restrictions on
campaign contributions somewhat more leniently. The RNC
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19. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446.
20. Id. at 1441.
21. Cf., e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 412-
20 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
22. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
23. Id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Citizens United, Inc. v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
24. 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
25. 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
26. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
27. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2638. 
28. Id. at 2632.
29. Id. at 2645 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 2638 n.19.
urged the Court to apply
strict scrutiny across the
board.
In a plurality opinion
joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, and Alito, Chief
Justice Roberts declined the
RNC’s invitation to abandon
the expenditure-contribution
distinction but nevertheless
concluded that the aggregate
limits on contributions did
not adequately serve the Gov-
ernment’s interest in avoiding
quid pro quo corruption. The
Chief Justice acknowledged that the Buckley Court had
upheld FECA’s aggregate limit, but he pointed out that the
Court had only “spent a total of three sentences” on the issue
and that the litigants in Buckley had focused most of their
energies elsewhere.19 Taking a fresh look at the matter, and
pointing to a range of ways in which circumventing the base
limits is either illegal or impractical (or could be made so by
Congress), the plurality concluded that the aggregate limits
placed unwarranted constraints on donors’ First Amendment
rights. The Chief Justice acknowledged that the ruling was
likely to be unpopular in some circles but insisted that it
flowed from the demands of the First Amendment. “If the
First Amendment protects flag burning, funeral protests, and
Nazi parades—despite the profound offense such spectacles
cause,” Chief Justice Robert wrote, “it surely protects political
campaign speech despite popular opposition.”20
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas reiterated his
view that the Court should abandon Buckley’s distinction
between contributions and expenditures and should review
limitations on the former just as skeptically as it reviews lim-
itations on the latter.21 He nevertheless expressed satisfaction
that the plurality’s opinion “continues to chip away at [Buck-
ley’s] footings.”22
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice
Breyer dissented, embracing the Government’s defense of the
aggregate limits. “Taken together with Citizens United v. Fed-
eral Election Commission,” he wrote, “today’s decision eviscer-
ates our Nation’s campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant
incapable of dealing with the grave problems of democratic
legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve.”23
PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONS
Two years ago, writing for a 5-4 majority in Knox v. Service
Employees International Union,24 Justice Alito stated in dictum
that allowing state and local governments to force their
employees to pay fees to unions—even if those employees are
not themselves union members—raises serious First Amend-
ment concerns. In Harris v. Quinn,25 decided this past Term,
litigants and their amici launched a full-fledged effort to per-
suade the Court to close that circle by overruling Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education26 and holding that public employees
who decline to join a union have a First Amendment right to
refuse to contribute to that union’s expenses, even if they ben-
efit from the union’s collective-bargaining activities. Writing
again for the same five-justice majority, Justice Alito declined
that invitation but once again made it clear that Abood’s
longevity is far from assured.
The dispute in Harris concerned individuals who work as
“personal assistants” in Illinois, providing in-home care for
Medicaid recipients. The personal assistants are jointly
employed by the State of Illinois (which compensates them)
and by Medicaid beneficiaries (who hire and supervise them).
SEUI Illinois & Indiana serves as the personal assistants’
exclusive bargaining representative with the state. The plain-
tiffs were personal assistants who declined to join the union
and who objected to a requirement that they pay the union an
“agency fee” to help cover the costs of collective bargaining. A
ruling in the plaintiffs’ favor on that point would have neces-
sitated overruling Abood.
Led by Justice Alito, the Court refrained from abandoning
Abood, choosing instead to find that precedent distinguish-
able. Abood, the Court reasoned, applies only to “full-fledged
public employees,” rather than to those whose work—like
that of the personal assistants here—is controlled in signifi-
cant ways by non-governmental employers.27 Freed of Abood’s
constraints, the majority found that the agency-fee require-
ment violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by com-
pelling them to speak. Justice Alito nevertheless devoted 13
pages of his slip opinion to dictum arguing that Abood was
thinly reasoned and is “questionable on several grounds.”28
Justice Kagan wrote for the dissenters, finding Abood indis-
tinguishable but expressing relief that the majority stopped
short of overruling that decision altogether. Recognizing that
Abood’s future nevertheless remains in doubt, Justice Kagan
insisted that it be preserved. “Our precedent about precedent,
fairly understood and applied,” she wrote, “makes it impossi-
ble for this Court to reverse that decision.”29 The majority dis-
missed Justice Kagan’s discussion of stare decisis as “beside the
point.”30
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ TESTIMONY
Suppose that a public employee testifies truthfully in a
court proceeding about information he learned while doing
114 Court Review - Volume 50  
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31. 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014).
32. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
33. Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (emphasis added). The Court further
held, however, that because this doctrinal matter had not been
clearly settled at the time Franks took action against Lane, Franks
was protected by qualified immunity.
34. Id. at 2384 (Thomas, J., concurring).
35. 134 S. Ct. 2056 (2014).
36. Id. at 2061.
37. The Court ruled in Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013), that when reviewing a public university’s race-conscious
efforts to assemble a diverse class of entering students, a court
must not defer to the university’s choice of means. The court
“must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alter-
natives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.” Id. at
2420.
38. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
39. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
40. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
41. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
42. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of the Univ. of
Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (quoting Seat-
tle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 472), rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
his job but that the act of testifying is not itself among that
employee’s typical job responsibilities. Does the First Amend-
ment protect the employee against any adverse action that the
testimony might provoke his employer to take against him?
That was the question before the Court in Lane v. Franks.31
While working as the director of an Alabama-funded program,
Edward Lane uncovered evidence that a member of the
Alabama legislature was billing the state for work she never
actually performed. When federal officials subsequently
launched criminal proceedings against the legislator, Lane tes-
tified both before the grand jury and then again at trial. When
Steve Franks, Lane’s supervisor, terminated Lane’s employ-
ment not long thereafter, Lane brought suit against Franks
and others, claiming a retaliatory violation of his First
Amendment rights. The Eleventh Circuit held that the First
Amendment offered Lane no protection. Under Garcetti v.
Ceballos,32 the court of appeals reasoned, Lane was testifying
as a state employee—not as a citizen—because he was testify-
ing about information he learned during the course of his
employment.
Led by Justice Sotomayor, the Court unanimously reversed,
explaining that “[t]he critical question under Garcetti is
whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope
of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those
duties.”33 The Court declined to say whether the First Amend-
ment protects employees (such as police officers and crime-
lab technicians) whose jobs do ordinarily include testifying in
judicial proceedings. In a brief concurring opinion joined by
Justices Scalia and Alito, Justice Thomas reiterated that that
important question was reserved “for another day.”34
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
Nearly 10 years after President George W. Bush made a last-
minute change of dinner plans while campaigning in Jack-
sonville, Oregon, a unanimous Court in Wood v. Moss35 finally
resolved the dinner decision’s legal consequences. Scrambling
to protect the President after he decided to eat in the outdoor
patio area of a local restaurant, members of the Secret Service
had moved a group of protestors to a location that was a little
farther away from President Bush than a group that had gath-
ered to voice their admiration of him. The protestors alleged
that the Secret Service agents had committed viewpoint dis-
crimination in violation of the First Amendment.
Just as it had done in several prior cases, the Court assumed,
without deciding, that the First Amendment creates an implied
right of action for damages against federal officials. Writing for
the Court, Justice Ginsburg
explained that the agents were
nevertheless entitled to qualified
immunity because “[n]o decision
of this Court so much as hinted
[to the agents] that their on-the-
spot action was unlawful because
they failed to keep the protestors
and supporters, throughout the
episode, equidistant from the
President.”36 The Court relied
heavily upon a map that the
plaintiffs had attached to their
complaint, which showed that,
until the Secret Service moved
them, the protestors had a direct
line of sight to—and were within
weapons range of—the Presi-
dent’s dining location, while a
two-story building stood between the President and the spot
where his supporters had gathered.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
RACE-BASED PREFERENCES IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS
For the second consecutive year,37 the Court handed down
a major decision concerning racial preferences in public uni-
versities’ admissions processes. At issue in Schuette v. Coalition
to Defend Affirmative Action38 was a 2006 amendment to the
Michigan Constitution forbidding racial preferences in
(among other things) public education. A few years earlier,
the Court had upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s
race-conscious efforts to assemble a diverse student body,
finding that the school’s efforts were narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state purpose.39 The Court had not said
that such efforts were constitutionally required, however, and
Michigan voters opted to bring them to an end.
Citing the “political-process doctrine”—a doctrine it traced
to Hunter v. Erickson40 and Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 141—the en banc Sixth Circuit found that the Michigan
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause because it
“(1) has a racial focus, targeting a policy or program that
‘inures primarily to the benefit of the minority’; and (2) real-
locates political power or reorders the decisionmaking process
in a way that places special burdens on a minority group’s
ability to achieve its goals through that process.”42
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43. Justice Kagan did not participate in the case.
44. The plurality said that Hunter stands for “the unremarkable prin-
ciple that the State may not alter the procedures of government to
target racial minorities.” Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632. As for Seat-
tle School District No. 1, the plurality concluded that key passages
on which the Sixth Circuit had seized “went well beyond the
analysis needed to resolve the case.” Id. at 1634.
45. Id. at 1637.
46. Id. at 1647 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
47. Id. at 1648 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
48. He did, however, briefly express skepticism about the doctrine.
See id. at 1651 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he
principle that underlies Hunter and Seattle runs up against a com-
peting principle . . . favor[ing] decisionmaking through the demo-
cratic process.”).
49. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 748 (2007).
50. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1675 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1639 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
52. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
53. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). The dispute in Noel Canning arose when
the National Labor Relations Board ordered a Pepsi-Cola distribu-
tor to execute a collective-bargaining agreement with a labor
union. The distributor argued that the board’s order was illegiti-
mate because three of the board’s members had been invalidly
appointed by President Obama during purported Senate recesses.
54. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
55. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2561.
56. Id. at 2564.
57. Id. at 2567. The Court noted that neither house of Congress is per-
mitted to adjourn mid-session without the consent of the other
for a period of “more than three days.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
4. “A Senate recess that is so short that it does not require the con-
sent of the House,” the majority reasoned, “is not long enough to
trigger the President’s recess-appointments power.”  Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. at 2566.
A divided Supreme Court
reversed.43 In a plurality opin-
ion joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito, Jus-
tice Kennedy rejected the polit-
ical-process doctrine and con-
cluded that Hunter and Seattle
School District No.1 were best
understood as having been
decided on other grounds.44
The plurality said that the polit-
ical-process doctrine unwisely
presumed that racial categories
can be clearly delineated and
that members of an identified
racial group share common
political interests. Perhaps even
more fundamentally, the plural-
ity said, “[i]t is demeaning to
the democratic process to presume that the voters are not
capable of deciding an issue of this sensitivity on decent and
rational grounds.”45
Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment, arguing that the plurality had stretched too far to
find rationales on which the outcomes in Hunter and Seattle
School District No. 1 could be justified. Justice Scalia feared
that lurking in the plurality’s refusal to overrule those cases
was a willingness to accept “the proposition that a facially
neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it has a
disparate racial impact.”46 A party alleging racial discrimina-
tion in violation of the Equal Protection Clause must prove
discriminatory purpose, Justice Scalia wrote, and those chal-
lenging Michigan’s constitutional amendment “do not have a
prayer of proving it here.”47
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, finding it unnec-
essary to decide whether to embrace the political-process doc-
trine because, in his view, Michigan voters had not reordered
the political process.48 He concluded that the Constitution
posed no obstacles to the Michigan amendment.
Joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Sotomayor dissented,
strongly embracing the Sixth Circuit’s articulation of the polit-
ical-process doctrine and arguing that it demanded invalida-
tion of the Michigan amendment. Linking the Court’s con-
trary ruling to Chief Justice Roberts’s declaration in 2007 that
“[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to
stop discriminating on the basis of race,”49 she insisted that
this was “a sentiment out of touch with reality.”50 That claim
prompted Chief Justice Roberts to file a brief concurrence,
arguing that “[p]eople can disagree in good faith [about the
desirability of racial preferences], but it . . . does more harm
than good to question the openness and candor of those on
either side of the debate.”51
EXECUTIVE POWER: RECESS APPOINTMENTS
Ordinarily, of course, the President must obtain the Senate’s
“Advice and Consent” when appointing federal officers.52 In
NLRB v. Noel Canning,53 the Court resolved important issues
concerning the President’s ability to evade Senate obstacles by
exercising his power to “fill up all Vacancies that may happen
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”54 Led by
Justice Breyer, a majority of the Court reached three signifi-
cant conclusions. First, the Court held that the term “Recess”
in the clause just quoted refers not only to breaks that happen
between formal sessions of Congress but also to breaks “of
substantial length” that occur within a given formal session.55
Between the founding and the present day, Justice Breyer
explained, presidents have made “countless” recess appoint-
ments during intra-session breaks, and the Senate has never
taken the position that such appointments are categorically
invalid.56 With respect to how long an intra-session break
must be in order to be deemed substantial, the Court found
that “a recess of more than 3 days but less than 10 days is pre-
sumptively too short to fall within the Clause.”57
Second, the Court found that the recess-appointments
power applies not only to vacancies that first arise during a
recess (a point on which everyone agreed) but also to vacan-
cies that arise before a recess and that continue to exist when
the Senate breaks. The majority conceded that its interpreta-
tion was in tension with the language of Article II (“Vacancies
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58. Id. at 2570.
59. Id. at 2574.
60. Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). The majority
replied that Justice Scalia’s reading of the Constitution “would
render illegitimate thousands of recess appointments reaching all
the way back to the founding era.” Id. at 2577.
61. Id. at 2618 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
62. Nos. 13-354, 13-356, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505 (June 30, 2014).
63. The birth-control methods to which the corporations objected
were two kinds of morning-after pills and two kinds of
intrauterine devices, all of which can terminate fertilized eggs’
development.
64. The three closely held for-profit corporations before the Court
were Conestoga Wood Specialties, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., and
Mardel.
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a), (b).
66. The majority reserved judgment, however, on whether this
approach would itself violate RFRA—a reservation that would
acquire great prominence just days after Hobby Lobby Stores came
down. On July 3, 2014, the Court granted Wheaton College’s
application for an order temporarily shielding it from having to
follow the precise certification process prescribed by the govern-
ment for nonprofit organizations with religious objections to the
contraception mandate. That order drew a sharp dissent from the
Court’s three female justices. See Wheaton College v. Burwell, No.
13A1284, __ S Ct. __, 2014 WL 3020426 (July 3, 2014).
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate”) but found
that a broad reading best served the framers’ purpose of ensur-
ing that the President can obtain the services of officers when
the Senate is not available to confirm their appointments. The
majority also relied heavily upon the fact that “[t]he tradition
of applying the Clause to pre-recess vacancies dates at least to
President James Madison” and has been followed over the
ensuing generations on scores of occasions.58
Finally, the Court held that, when calculating the length of
a recess, pro forma sessions cannot be ignored. During the
roughly month-long break at issue in this case, the Senate
held twice-weekly pro forma sessions. President Obama had
made the challenged appointments roughly in the middle of
that month-long break, one day after one pro forma session
and two days before the next. If the Court had disregarded
those pro forma sessions, the Senate’s break easily would have
been long enough to trigger the President’s recess-appoint-
ments power. The Court found, however, that “for purposes of
the Recess Appointments Clause, the Senate is in session
when it says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains
the capacity to transact Senate business.”59 As a result, the
challenged appointments in this case were made during a Sen-
ate break of only three days—a period not long enough to
bring the recess-appointments power into play.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Alito, Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment. In his
view, the recess-appointments power only comes into play
during breaks between formal sessions of Congress and
applies only “to vacancies that arise during the recess in
which they are filled.”60 Looking ahead to future separation-
of-powers disputes, Justice Scalia worried that the majority’s
“adverse-possession theory of executive power . . . will be
cited in diverse contexts, including those presently unimag-
ined, and will have the effect of aggrandizing the Presidency
beyond its constitutional bounds.”61
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
In their final public sitting of the Term, the Court handed
down one of the year’s most highly anticipated rulings. The
issue in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,62 was whether the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) spares closely held
for-profit corporations from the federal requirement that they
provide their employees with health-insurance coverage for
federally approved forms of birth control that the corporations’
owners regarded as methods of abortion.63 By a 5-4 margin, the
Court held that RFRA does
indeed lift that requirement from
those corporations’ shoulders.64
RFRA states that the federal
government cannot “substan-
tially burden” a person’s exercise
of religion unless it can show
“that application of the burden to
the person . . . is the least restric-
tive means of furthering [a] com-
pelling governmental interest.”65
In an opinion by Justice Alito,
the Court first found that for-
profit corporations are “persons” within the meaning of the
statute. The Dictionary Act explicitly includes corporations in
that term’s definition, the Court said, and there is nothing
about RFRA’s context that suggests Congress intended a nar-
rower definition to apply. The Department of Health and
Human Services had conceded during the litigation that non-
profit corporations can be persons and can exercise religion
within the meaning of RFRA, and the Court could find no per-
suasive reason to believe Congress intended otherwise with
respect to corporations that seek a profit.
Having found RFRA applicable, the majority determined
that the contraception mandate substantially burdens the exer-
cise of religion by the plaintiff corporations and their owners
because, if they ignored the mandate, the companies faced sub-
stantial annual fines. Assuming (rather than finding) that the
contraception mandate furthered compelling governmental
interests, the majority then determined that there were less
restrictive means of achieving the government’s objectives. The
federal government itself, for example, could assume the cost
of providing the corporations’ female employees with full con-
traception coverage. Or the government could make available
to closely held for-profit corporations the same accommoda-
tion that it already provides to nonprofit organizations with
religious objections to the contraception mandate—namely,
permit them to certify that they object to certain forms of con-
traception, thereby triggering a duty on the part of their insur-
ance providers or third-party administrators to exclude those
forms of contraception from the entities’ group health-insur-
ance coverage and to provide separate payments for those con-
traceptive services.66 The majority stressed that its decision
“concerned solely . . . the contraceptive mandate” and “should
not be understood to hold that an insurance-coverage mandate
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68. Id. at *117 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at *97 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at *154 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71. 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
72. Id. at 577-79. The Court reserved judgment on whether dismissal
was appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6), an issue not briefed by the
parties. See id. at 580.
73. Id. at 581.
74. The Court further explained that, “when a party bound by a
forum-selection clause flouts its contractual obligation and files
suit in a different forum, a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not
carry with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules.” Id. at 582.
75. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
76. MBUSA distributed Daimler vehicles to dealerships throughout
the United States, including California.
77. Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
78. Id. at 761-62 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S.
462, 472 (1985)). Justice Sotomayor preferred to ground the
Court’s judgment on the finding that it would be unreasonable to
allow a California-based court to take jurisdiction in this instance,
“given that the case involves foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign
defendant based on foreign conduct, and given that a more appro-
priate forum is available.” Id. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
the judgment).
must necessarily fall if it con-
flicts with an employer’s reli-
gious beliefs.”67 Justice
Kennedy emphasized the deci-
sion’s narrow scope in a sepa-
rate concurrence.
Justice Ginsburg dissented,
joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice
Ginsburg argued that the
majority’s decision would
place significant burdens upon
thousands of women who
worked for the plaintiff corporations and who desired the
forms of contraception to which their employers objected. She
found no reason to believe that Congress intended such a
result, noting (in a portion of her opinion joined only by Jus-
tice Sotomayor) that “[u]ntil this litigation, no decision of this
Court recognized a for-profit corporation’s qualification for a
religious exemption from a generally applicable law, whether
under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA.”68 Even if RFRA did
apply, Justice Ginsburg wrote, the contraception mandate did
not substantially burden the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion
because neither the corporations nor their owners were them-
selves required to purchase or provide the contraceptives at
issue, and because women and their health-care providers—
not the corporations or their owners—would be the ones
deciding whether the contraception was desirable. By issuing
what she regarded as “a decision of startling breadth,”69 she
warned that the Court was “ventur[ing] into a minefield.”70
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSES
In Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas,71 the Court clarified
when and how forum-selection clauses should be enforced.
When a dispute erupted between Virginia-based Atlantic
Marine Construction and Texas-based J-Crew Management, J-
Crew filed suit in the Western District of Texas, rather than in
the Eastern District of Virginia as prescribed by a forum-selec-
tion clause in the parties’ contract. Atlantic Marine moved to
dismiss the case altogether under Section 1406(a) or under
Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in
the alternative, to transfer the case to Virginia under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). The District Court denied both motions, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Led by Justice Alito, the Court unanimously reversed. The
justices agreed with the courts below that the forum-selection
clause did not render venue in Texas “wrong” or “improper”
and that dismissal under Section 1406(a) or Rule 12(b)(3)
was thus unwarranted.72 With respect to the motion to trans-
fer, however, the Court concluded that when a federal civil lit-
igant moves to transfer a case in accordance with a forum-
selection clause, “[o]nly under extraordinary circumstances
unrelated to the convenience of the parties should [the] §
1404(a) motion be denied.”73 The plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that the forum-selection clause should be dis-
regarded due to public-interest concerns, the Court said, and
J-Crew had not carried that burden here.74
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Companies with substantial business operations in multi-
ple states will be heartened by the Court’s ruling in Daimler
AG v. Bauman.75 Argentinian plaintiffs had filed a federal suit
in California against Daimler AG (Daimler), a German com-
pany. The plaintiffs argued that Daimler was subject to general
jurisdiction in California due to the operations in that state of
Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), a Daimler subsidiary.76 The
Ninth Circuit held that MBUSA was Daimler’s agent for juris-
dictional purposes, that MBUSA’s California contacts were
thus attributable to Daimler, and that those contacts were suf-
ficient to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion for eight mem-
bers, Justice Ginsburg first found that the Ninth Circuit’s
agency analysis was too lenient because it “appear[ed] to sub-
ject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever
they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate.”77 More signifi-
cantly, the Court found that, even if MBUSA’s California con-
tacts were attributable to Daimler, it would violate the Due
Process Clause to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction
there. While acknowledging that a company could be subject
to general jurisdiction in states other than those of its place of
incorporation and principal place of business, the Court
recoiled from the suggestion that Daimler was subject to gen-
eral jurisdiction in every state where MBUSA had a significant
presence. “Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdic-
tion,” Justice Ginsburg wrote, “would scarcely permit out-of-
state defendants ‘to structure their primary conduct with
some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and
will not render them liable to suit.’”78
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(1998) (statutory standing); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. New-
dow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
751 (1984)) (prudential standing).
84. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
85. Static Control alleged that Lexmark made false statements about
its own products and about those manufactured by Static Control.
86. Id. at 1387 n.4 (internal quotation omitted). The Court dropped
an additional footnote to address, in dictum, one other self-
inflicted misunderstanding. The jurisdictional ban on “general-
ized grievances” flows from the requirements of Article III, Justice
Scalia explained, rather than—as the Court had elsewhere indi-
cated—from the Court’s assessment of prudential concerns. See id.
at 1387 n.3. 
87. Id. at 1388.
88. Id. at 1391.
89. 134 S Ct. 2334 (2014).
The Court again underscored the limitations on federal
courts’ jurisdictional reach in Walden v. Fiore.79 Anthony
Walden was a Georgia police officer who had been deputized
by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to work at
the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. Suspect-
ing illegal drug activity, Walden seized roughly $97,000 in
cash that Gina Fiore and Keith Gipson were carrying with
them while changing planes in Atlanta en route from Puerto
Rico to Nevada. Fiore and Gipson explained that they were
professional gamblers and that the cash represented their
“bank” and lawful winnings. Walden and his colleagues were
unpersuaded, however, and so Fiore and Gipson returned
home to Nevada empty-handed. After months of wrangling,
the DEA finally returned the money. Fiore and Gipson then
filed a Bivens action against Walden in federal district court in
Nevada, alleging (among other things) that he had resisted the
funds’ return by filing a false affidavit with the U.S. Attorney
in Georgia. Walden moved to dismiss, arguing that he was not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The Ninth Circuit
rejected Walden’s argument, but the Supreme Court unani-
mously embraced it. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas explained that,
under the familiar “minimum contacts” analysis, a federal
court must focus on “the defendant’s contacts with the forum
State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who
reside there.”80 The Ninth Circuit had erred, the Court said,
by focusing on Walden’s knowledge that Fiore and Gipson
resided in Nevada and on the fact that those two plaintiffs suf-
fered foreseeable harm in that state, rather than on Walden’s
actual contacts with Nevada. Fiore and Gipson 
lacked access to their funds in Nevada not because any-
thing independently occurred there, but because
Nevada is where [they] chose to be at a time when they
desired to use the funds seized by [Walden]. [They]
would have experienced this same lack of access in Cal-
ifornia, Mississippi, or wherever else they might have
traveled and found themselves wanting more money
than they had.81
The Court acknowledged Fiore and Gipson’s warning that
this ruling could “bring about unfairness in cases where inten-
tional torts are committed via the Internet or other electronic
media,” but the justices said they were leaving “questions
about virtual contacts for another day.”82
PRUDENTIAL STANDING
AND THE “ZONE OF
INTERESTS”
Over the past few decades,
the Court had occasionally
indicated that whether a
plaintiff falls within the
“zone of interests” that Con-
gress intended to protect
with a given statute is a juris-
dictional issue concerning
“prudential” or “statutory”
standing.83 Taking their cue
from those and other prece-
dents, the parties in Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc.84
used the jurisdictional lan-
guage of standing when fram-
ing their disagreement about
whether Static Control could bring a false-advertising claim
against Lexmark under the Lanham Act.85 Writing for a unan-
imous Court, Justice Scalia explained that whether a plaintiff
falls within a statute’s zone of interests is really just a question
of whether the plaintiff has a federal cause of action. It is “mis-
leading” to call that a question of standing, Justice Scalia
wrote, “since the absence of a valid . . . cause of action does
not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s
statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.”86
The dispute in Lexmark thus raised “a straightforward
question of statutory interpretation: Does the cause of action
[provided in the Lanham Act] extend to plaintiffs like Static
Control?”87 The Court concluded that it did. Sweeping aside
alternative formulations devised by the lower courts, Justice
Scalia and his colleagues held that a party has a false-advertis-
ing claim under the Lanham Act if the defendant’s “deception
of consumers causes them to withhold trade from the plain-
tiff” and thus inflicts upon the plaintiff an “economic or rep-
utational injury flowing directly from the deception wrought
by the defendant’s advertising.”88
STANDING AND RIPENESS
With one important exception, the Court’s ruling in Susan
B. Anthony List v. Driehaus89 was unremarkable. Susan B.
Anthony List (SBAL)—an organization that opposes abor-
tion—filed a federal action for declaratory and injunctive
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relief, arguing that its First
Amendment rights were vio-
lated by an Ohio statute ren-
dering it a crime to make false
statements about candidates
for public office. SBAL had
already run into trouble with
state officials when it ran a
political advertisement assert-
ing that then-Congressman
Steven Driehaus voted in favor
of taxpayer-funded abortions,
and it feared it would
encounter similar trouble in
future elections. In an opinion
by Justice Thomas, the Court unanimously found that SBAL
faced an injury that was sufficiently imminent to satisfy the
requirements of Article III.
Of greater interest are the Court’s closing remarks concern-
ing the prudential requirements of ripeness. The Sixth Circuit
had found the case unripe, reasoning that SBAL would not
suffer undue hardship if adjudication of its constitutional
claims were delayed and that the factual record concerning
SBAL’s future political advocacy was insufficiently developed.
The Court cast at least a modicum of doubt on “the continu-
ing vitality” of those prudential requirements, noting that they
are “‘in some tension with our recent reaffirmation of the prin-
ciple that “a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide”
cases within its jurisdiction “is virtually unflagging.”’”90 But
the Court found that it did not yet need to resolve that tension
because those prudential requirements were “easily satisfied
here.”91
YOUNGER ABSTENTION
Emphasizing federal courts’ “virtually unflagging” obliga-
tion to adjudicate cases within their jurisdiction,92 the Court
in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs clarified the limits of
the abstention doctrines eponymously associated with
Younger v. Harris.93 The dispute arose from Sprint’s claim that
federal law preempted Iowa’s regulation of intrastate access
charges for certain calls placed over the Internet. An Iowa
administrative agency had rejected that claim. While that rul-
ing was under review in an Iowa court, Sprint filed a federal
suit against the agency. The Eighth Circuit concluded that
abstention was appropriate, reasoning that Younger abstention
is warranted whenever “(1) there is an ongoing state judicial
proceeding, which (2) implicates important state interests,
and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportu-
nity to raise constitutional challenges.”94
Led by Justice Ginsburg, the Court unanimously found
that the Eighth Circuit’s criteria swept too broadly. The Court
previously had indicated that Younger abstention is appropri-
ate if there are parallel state proceedings of one of three kinds:
criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement proceedings, or “civil
proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in further-
ance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial func-
tions.”95 Stressing that Younger abstention “extends to th[os]e
three exceptional circumstances, but no further,”96 the Sprint
Communications Court explained that civil enforcement pro-
ceedings render Younger abstention appropriate only if those
proceedings are “‘akin to a criminal prosecution’” in the sense
that they were initiated by a state actor (typically following an
investigation) to sanction a party for wrongful conduct.97 The
justices found those circumstances absent here.
COPYRIGHTS
In American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.,98
the Court ruled 6-3 that Aereo was violating copyrights held
by television broadcasters, producers, and others in broadcast
television programs. For a monthly fee, Aereo’s technology
enables a person to watch broadcast television programs on
Internet-connected devices. Upon receiving a request for a
specific program from a prospective viewer, Aereo devotes one
of its thousands of tiny antennae to the task of pulling down
the selected program’s broadcast signal for that viewer; it saves
a copy of that program on its hard drive (in a file dedicated to
that viewer) and then, with only a several-second delay
behind the original broadcast, it streams the program to the
viewer in an Internet-compatible format. Led by Justice
Breyer, a majority of the Court found that, with technological
updates, Aereo was replicating processes used by community
antenna television (CATV) systems—systems that the Court
had found permissible in a pair of rulings in 1968 and 1974,99
prompting Congress to amend the Copyright Act in 1976.
Under those 1976 amendments, the Court held, Aereo was
violating the copyright holders’ exclusive right to publicly
perform the copyrighted works.100
Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia dis-
sented. He argued that, because “Aereo’s automated system
does not relay any program, copyrighted or not, until a sub-
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scriber selects the program and tells Aereo to play it,” Aereo
was not itself performing the works.101 Justice Scalia reserved
judgment on whether Aereo could be held “secondarily”
liable under the Act for facilitating copyright infringements
by others.
PATENTS
In a pair of rulings handed down on the same day in early
June, the Court unanimously and pointedly reversed the Fed-
eral Circuit on patent matters. In Limelight Networks, Inc. v.
Akamai Technologies, Inc.102—a case concerning a patented
method of delivering electronic data—the Court held that a
party cannot be held liable for inducing patent infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) if no one has directly infringed the
patent in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) or some other statu-
tory provision. The Court said that, in reaching a contrary
conclusion on the facts of this case, “[t]he Federal Circuit’s
analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to
infringe a method patent.”103
In Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,104 the Court held
that a patent is not void for indefiniteness if the “patent’s
claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution
history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the
invention with reasonable certainty.”105 By finding the defi-
niteness requirement met if a patent’s claims are not “insol-
ubly ambiguous,” the Court said, the Federal Circuit had
adopted a test that was not “‘probative of the essential
inquiry’” and was “breed[ing] lower court confusion.”106
SECURITIES FRAUD
In Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice,107 the Court held that
the plaintiffs’ state-law class actions were not precluded by the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).
One of several measures aimed at curbing “perceived abuses
of the class-action vehicle in litigation involving nationally
traded securities,”108 SLUSA prohibits state-law class actions
alleging “a misrepresentation or omission of material fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.”109
“Covered securities” consist primarily of those traded on
national exchanges.110 The plaintiffs here alleged that they
had purchased certificates of deposit on the strength of the
issuer’s fraudulent assurance
that their funds would be
invested, at least in part, in
nationally traded securities.
The defendants contended
that SLUSA precluded the
plaintiffs’ class actions.
A majority of the justices
rejected the defendants’ argu-
ment, finding that “[a] fraud-
ulent misrepresentation or
omission is not made ‘in con-
nection with’ . . . a ‘purchase
or sale of a covered security’
unless it is material to a deci-
sion by one or more individ-
uals (other than the fraud-
ster) to buy or to sell a ‘covered security.’”111 In this case, the
only entity that was making decisions about whether to buy
or sell covered securities was one of the alleged fraudsters—
the bank that issued the certificates of deposit. Because their
state-law claims fell beyond the reach of SLUSA’s preclusion
provision, the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed.112
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,113 a majority of the
Court declined Halliburton’s suggestion that the Court make
it more difficult for private securities-fraud plaintiffs to prove
reliance upon defendants’ material misrepresentations. Under
the Court’s 1988 ruling in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,114 investors
are allowed to invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance—a
presumption that is grounded in the assumption that the price
of a stock reflects all publicly available information about that
stock, including fraudulent statements made by company offi-
cials. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court found
that Halliburton’s arguments against the Basic framework
were not sufficiently persuasive to overcome the weight of
stare decisis.115 Joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, Justice
Thomas concurred only in the judgment, finding that
“[l]ogic, economic realities, and our subsequent jurispru-
dence have undermined the foundations of the Basic pre-
sumption, and stare decisis cannot prop up the façade that
remains.”116
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SUPREMACY CLAUSE: 
PREEMPTION
In Northwest, Inc. v. Gins-
berg,117 the Court took up the
claim of Rabbi S. Binyomin
Ginsberg, whom Northwest Air-
lines had terminated from its
frequent-flyer program after the
airlines concluded that Ginsberg
was “abusing” the program by
(among other things) complain-
ing too frequently about such
matters as delayed luggage
delivery. Ginsberg claimed that, by terminating him on those
grounds, Northwest had breached its duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Northwest contended, however, that Ginsberg’s
state-law claim was preempted by the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 (ADA), which explicitly preempts any state “law,
regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of
law related to [an air carrier’s] price, route, or service.”118
With Justice Alito writing for the Court, the justices unan-
imously found Ginsberg’s claim preempted. The Court
observed that states vary with respect to how they view the
duty on which Ginsberg’s claim relied. In some states, the
duty of good faith and fair dealing is regarded as springing
from contracting parties’ reasonable expectations, while in
other states the duty is imposed upon parties pursuant to the
community’s public-policy judgments. When it comes to ADA
preemption, the source of the duty makes all the difference. If
a state regards the duty as flowing from the contracting par-
ties’ reasonable expectations, the Court said, then the duty is
essentially imposed by the parties themselves and falls outside
the terms of the ADA’s preemption provision. But if the duty is
imposed upon the parties by the state—as it was here—then
the duty flows from a “law, regulation, or other provision hav-
ing the force and effect of law” and so is explicitly preempted
by the ADA.
In CTS Corp. v. Waldburger,119 the Court found important
differences between statutes of limitations and statutes of
repose. Twenty-four years after CTS Corporation sold prop-
erty on which it had operated an electronics plant in North
Carolina, Peter Waldburger and others filed a state-law action
against CTS, alleging they had been harmed by toxic chemi-
cals CTS had stored there. North Carolina’s statute of repose
shielded tort defendants from lawsuits brought more than 10
years after their last culpable act. CTS sought the protection
of that statute, saying that its last culpable act was its sale of
the plant more than two decades earlier. Waldburger argued,
however, that North Carolina’s statute of repose was pre-
empted by the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Kennedy found no pre-
emption. He explained that a statute of limitations typically
establishes a period within which a harmed individual must
sue after being injured or discovering that he or she has been
harmed, while a statute of repose “puts an outer limit on the
right to bring a civil action,” typically measured “from the
date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant.”120
Justice Kennedy pointed out that CERCLA’s preemption pro-
vision explicitly refers to states’ statutes of limitations but says
nothing explicitly about states’ statutes of repose. A congres-
sionally commissioned study group had acknowledged those
two different kinds of state statutes and had urged state law-
makers to remove both sets of obstacles for future plaintiffs.
Rather than await state action, however, Congress opted to
legislate—and when it did, it adopted a preemption provision
that dealt only with state statutes of limitations, evidently opt-
ing to leave the fate of state statutes of repose in state law-
makers’ hands.121
TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
In a 5-4 ruling that did not break along familiar lines, the
Court ruled in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community122 that
Bay Mills—a federally recognized Indian tribe—was protected
by tribal sovereign immunity against an action brought
against it by the State of Michigan. Michigan had alleged that,
by opening a casino off tribal lands, the Tribe had violated
both the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) and a
compact that the state and Bay Mills entered in 1993.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, Justice Kagan took as her starting
premises that Indian tribes are subject to Congress’s “plenary
control” as “‘domestic dependent nations,’” yet enjoy sover-
eign immunity to the extent Congress has chosen not to abro-
gate it.123 She then pointed out that IGRA partially abrogates
the tribes’ immunity for actions brought in federal court con-
cerning certain gaming activities “located on Indian lands”124
but lacks a comparable provision concerning gaming activities
off Indian lands. “This Court has no roving license, in even
ordinary cases of statutory interpretation, to disregard clear
[statutory] language,” Justice Kagan wrote, and is “still less”
empowered to rewrite statutes “when the consequence would
be to expand an abrogation of immunity.”125
Likely recognizing that its abrogation argument was not air-
tight, Michigan had urged the Court to hold that tribal sover-
eign immunity does not extend in the first instance to legal
actions concerning tribes’ commercial activities off tribal lands.
The Court had rejected that very proposition in its 1998 ruling
in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies,
Inc.,126 however, and the Court declined to backtrack here. Cit-
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ing the principle of stare decisis as “a foundation stone of the
rule of law,”127 the majority concluded that Congress is now
the appropriate entity to decide whether the policy course
charted in Kiowa remains desirable.
The Court’s ruling in Kiowa provided the focal point of Jus-
tice Thomas’s dissent. Joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and
Alito, he argued that Kiowa was “unsupported by any ratio-
nale . . . , inconsistent with the limits on tribal sovereignty,
and an affront to state sovereignty.”128 Emphasizing that tribal
immunity is a doctrine of the Court’s—not Congress’s—cre-
ation, Justice Thomas believed the majority’s reluctance to
overturn Kiowa was misplaced. In the 16 years since Kiowa
was decided, he wrote, tribes’ gaming revenues had “more
than tripled,” giving rise to numerous concerns that—at least
when arising from tribes’ commercial activities off tribal
lands—states should be free to address without having to deal
with the obstacles that tribal immunity poses.129
Justice Scalia filed a separate, one-paragraph opinion,
expressing regret for having joined the majority in Kiowa and
saying that the Court itself should “clean up [the] mess that I
helped make,” rather than leave that task to Congress.130 Jus-
tice Ginsburg also filed a short separate opinion, drawing an
unfavorable connection between the Court’s broad construc-
tion of tribal immunity in Kiowa and the Court’s expansive
rulings in other cases concerning states’ sovereign immunity.
She predicted that “[n]either brand of immoderate, judicially
confirmed immunity . . . will have staying power.”131
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund,132 the
Court unanimously held that “[w]hether [a] claim for attor-
ney’s fees is based on a statute, a contract, or both, the pen-
dency of a ruling on an award for fees and costs does not pre-
vent, as a general rule, the merits judgment from becoming
final for purposes of appeal.”133 In the case before it, the Court
thus ruled that the 30-day clock for filing a notice of appeal
began to run when the district court issued its ruling on the
merits, rather than when the district court subsequently ruled
on a motion for attorney’s fees.
In Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp.,134 the
Court unanimously held that a civil suit does not qualify as a
“mass action” under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005—
and so is not removable from state to federal court under that
legislation’s mass-action provisions135—when a state is the
lone named plaintiff in a lawsuit aimed at redressing injuries
suffered by many of that
state’s citizens.
Contributing to what can-
not be a good public-rela-
tions story for the Coca-Cola
Company, the Court held in
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-
Cola Co.136 that POM Won-
derful—the producer of a
pomegranate-blueberry juice
blend—could bring a Lan-
ham Act unfair-competition
suit against Coca-Cola for
prominently placing the
words “pomegranate blue-
berry” on the label of a prod-
uct that, in reality, contains
only miniscule amounts of those juices. The Ninth Circuit
had ruled that POM Wonderful’s suit was precluded by the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, but the Court unanimously
reversed, finding that “the FDCA and the Lanham Act com-
plement each other in the federal regulation of misleading
food and beverage labels.”137
In Lawson v. FMR LLC,138 the Court held that a whistle-
blower-protecting provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 extends not only to the employees of public companies
but also to the employees of those companies’ contractors and
subcontractors.
Pointing out that equitable tolling is available only when it
comports with the lawmakers’ intent, the Court in Lozano v.
Montoya Alvarez139 held that the parties to the Hague Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction did
not want courts to toll the one-year period after which it
becomes more difficult for a parent to secure the return of a
child who was taken to a different country by the other parent.
Citing the familiar Chevron-deference framework,140 the
Court in EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.,141 upheld the
Environmental Protection Agency’s cost-efficiency formula for
determining the amount of air pollution that an upwind state
must eliminate to bring downwind states into compliance
with air-quality standards established pursuant to the Clean
Air Act.
The EPA received a mostly favorable split decision in Util-
ity Air Regulatory Group v. EPA.142 Piecing together the results
handed down by a splintered Court, one finds that the EPA
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currently lacks statutory authority to impose permitting
requirements on stationary entities based solely on their
potential to emit large amounts of greenhouse gases, but that
the agency may require stationary entities to employ “best
available control technology” for greenhouse-gas emissions if
those entities already are subject to permitting requirements
for more conventional pollutants.
In United States v. Quality Stores, Inc.,143 the Court unani-
mously concluded that severance payments made to involun-
tarily terminated employees are taxable wages under the Fed-
eral Insurance Contributions Act.
Rejecting the reasoning of several lower federal appellate
courts, the Court unanimously held in Fifth Third Bancorp v.
Dudenhoeffer144 that fiduciaries of employee-stock-ownership
plans are not entitled to a special presumption that they have
behaved prudently.
LOOKING AHEAD
At the time of this writing, the Court already has slated a
wide range of significant cases for its 2014-2015 docket. The
issues it intends to confront include, among others, the con-
stitutionality of redistricting efforts in Alabama;145 the consti-
tutionality of a state’s effort to tax all of the income of its res-
idents, including income earned and taxed in other states;146
the evidentiary requirements for removal from state to federal
court;147 whether a state prison’s ban on beards violates the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000;148 whether and how a court may enforce the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s statutory duty to try
to conciliate discrimination claims before filing suit;149
whether federal agencies may revise their interpretive rules
without a notice-and-comment period;150 how to determine
whether a city’s sign ordinance is content-based or content-
neutral;151 whether the deadlines for filings claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act are subject to equitable tolling;152 and
the scope of employers’ duty to accommodate pregnant
employees under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.153
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